[ Excerpt from the "Official history of 82nd Division
American Expeditionary Forces: "All American" Division, 1917-1919" ]
Major General George B. Duncan
Official History of 82nd Division American Expeditionary Forces
"All American' Division
Written by Divisional Officers
Designated by the Division Commander
1917-1919
HISTORY OF THE 307th FIELD SIGNAL BATTALION
Contributed by Dellman O. Hood, Captain Signal Corps, U. S. Army
The 307th Field Signal Battalion, of the 82nd Division, National Army,
was organized and trained at Camp Gordon, Atlanta, Ga. The battalion
was first commanded by Maj. John B. Hemphill, of the Regular Array. Major
Hemphill continued In command, in addition to performing the duties of
Division Signal Officer, for several months, until Capt. Kilberth D.
Schaefer, at that time in command of Company B, was promoted to the grade
of Major and placed in command of the battalion.
Major Hemphill left Camp Gordon early in April, 1918, with the advance
party of the Division for France. Upon arrival overseas he was promoted
to the grade of Lieutenant-Colonel.
With very few exceptions, all of the officers and enlisted men were
men of many years practical experience in telephone, telegraph and radio
communication work. About 60 per cent of the enlisted personnel were
men who had enlisted in the Signal Reserve Corps. The majority of these
men came from the Middle Western states of Illinois, Wisconsin, Missouri,
Indiana and Ohio. The Radio Company was made up largely of men from the
radio class, Beloit University, of Beloit, Wisconsin. All of these men
had taken special courses in radio telegraphy at this university and
had enlisted in the Signal Reserve Corps.
The Wire and Outpost Companies had on their rosters a large number of
men from the large commercial telephone, telegraph and railroad companies,
who had enlisted in the Signal Reserve Corps.
The remainder of the enlisted personnel were drafted men from practically
every section of the United States. Upon reporting at Camp Gordon these
men were classified according to qualifications, those with previous
telephone, telegraph and radio experience being assigned to the Signal
Battalion. Thus, the battalion was an organization of picked men.
Thanks to the untiring efforts of Lt. Col. Hemphill, much telephone,
telegraph, radio and optical equipment, of the type to be used in France,
was procured. With this equipment a number of day and night maneuvers
were conducted at Camp Gordon.
Lieutenant Defert and Sergeant Pazin of the French Signal Corps were
attached to the Battalion as instructors and remained with the organization
until its arrival in France. These two gentlemen had seen two years'
active service at the front with the French army and were a valuable
asset in the instruction of the Battalion.
A Division signal school was organized by the Division Signal Officer
with Lieutenant Defert, Sergeant Pazin and personnel from the Signal
Battalion as instructors. Telephony, buzzer telegraphy, radio, optical
and other means of signaling were taught to officers and men from the
infantry signal platoons, artillery and machine-gun signal details. Many
practical maneuvers in signal work were conducted for the benefit of
these students. The elaborate system of trenches at Camp Gordon was completely
wired up by the Signal Battalion under the direction of Lieutenant Defert
and Sergeant Pazin, exactly as was being done at the front in France.
On May 9, 1918, the Battalion left Camp Gordon for Camp Mills, Long
Island. After a few clays' rest at Camp Mills, the Battalion embarked
on the 18th of May aboard the British ship Virginian for overseas. On
May 31 the Battalion disembarked at Liverpool, England, proceeding from
there by train to Winchester, England, from which place it proceeded
across the English Channel to Le Havre, France, arriving June 4, 1918.
From Le Havre the Battalion was ordered to Rougeux, Haute-Marne. Here
the Battalion rested a few days until orders were received to proceed
to ToiU, arriving Jvme 23. The following morning the Battalion began
moving into the Lagny sector, north of Toul, to relieve the 101st Field
Signal Battalion of the 26th Division.
This had been known as a so-called quiet sector, but due to the activities
of the American troops, characterized by the raids at Seicheprey and
Xivray, it was fast becoming semi-active. Previous to our arrival the
German artillery fire had been at times rather heavy and it was decided
to establish Division Headquarters at Lucey instead of Boucq, which had
been the Division P.O. of the 26th Division. This change necessitated
much readjustment in the communication system with the establishment
of several new trunk, and many local telephone lines.
Despite the fact that our battalion had had no previous experience in
the lines, and no training in France, the relief in this sector was accomplished
with despatch and without a hitch in the plans.
Another point worthy of mention is that of the close liaison established
with the French artillery, which had relieved the 26th Division Artillery
- our artillery being at that time in training in Southern France.
Our operators quickly acquired a working knowledge of the French language
and telephonic liaison with the French was handled with remarkable
despatch.
Joint French and American switchboards were established at all important
posts. Our men and the French Signal men worked in perfect harmony
and soon became real "buddies".
Shortly after moving into this sector it was decided to move back several
of the Regimental P.C.'s. During this movement about five miles of buried
cable - 30 pair, were laid from the regimental P.C.'s to within a short
distance of the front line. A mechanical trench-digger was used for this
purpose, details of men following the trench-digger laying the cable,
and other details filling in the trench. Near the front lines the work
was Ciuried on at night, but a little farther back where the route extended
through woods it was possible to work during the day without detection
by tlie enemy. No v.ork was left uncovered during the day - that is,
all unfinished wurlv was carefully camouflaged, in order to prevent the
enemy aeroplanes from making photographs of the project.
This being a fairly quiet sector, an extensive optical system was
operated with a considerable degree o€ suc^ ?. This system, however,
was not needed for practical use . ad was maintained merely as an emergency
means of communication.
T. P. S. (Earth Telegraphy) was installed and used between Regimental
and Battalion P.C.'s. Radio communication was established between Regimental
and Brigade P.C.'s, and from Brigades to Division. Buzzer-phones were
used between Battalion and Company P.C.'s. An E-3 radio set was installed
at Division Headquarters and used for listening-in on German radio stations.
Every radio station, in fact, listened-in and copied all German messages,
which were turned in daily to our Intelligence section. The telephone,
however, was our practical means of commmiication, all other methods
being maintained as emergency means and for test purposes.
On the night of August 4, 1918, the Gei-man lines north of Flirey
were raided by the 326tli Infantry. The Signal detail attached to the
Regiment
from the Outpost Company and commanded by 1st Lt. Glenn S. Matthevs's,
went "over the top" with the infantry and maintained telephonic
communication throughout the raid, despite the heavy and almost continuous
counterbarrage laid down by the Germans. The wire used was No. 22 twisted
pair, or better known as small "outpost *wist." It was carried
forward on spools containing about one kilometer of circuit and each
spool transported by two signal men. Details of two men each were dropped
about every hundred yards or more to test in and repair breaks. During
this operation the Signal Battalion had three men wovinded.
On the night Of August 8-9, during the relief of the 82nd Division by
the 89th Division, the German artillery filled the valley around Bayard,
north of Noviant, with a high gas concentration. Without a thought to
their personal safety. Corporals McClendon, Aikeus and Grubbs, and Privates
Evenson, Fenn, Hendrix, Blanco and Taylor remained at their posts repairing
broken lines and putting through telephone calls for ambulances, and
medical aid and transmitting important orders. Some of these men worked
with their gas masks on for eight continuous hours, and every man stuck
to his post until completely overcome by the gas and had to be evacuated
to hospitals. All were more or less badly gassed and burned with mustard
gas, Private Taylor dying from injuries received. Nevertheless their
devotion to duty was not in vain, for thanks to the valor of these men,
It was possible to summon ambulances promptly and evacuate the woimded
with very little delay. While the casualties were very heavy, 701, to
be exact, there were very few deaths because the wounded were able to
be evacuated without delay and receive prompt treatment. A new and inexperienced
division was coming into the lines for the first time, and but for the
bravery and cool-headedness of this small detail of Signal Corps men,
it would have been several hours before word could have been sent to
the rear and assistance rendered. This is a fair example of the type
of men the Battalion was made up of, and the importance of their work
on the front.
During our stay in the Lagny sector, the Germans attempted several times
to tap our telephone and buzzer-phone lines in and near the front-line
trenches, coming out for this purpose during the night. They succeeded
in making an actual tap one night near Xivray, but fortunately the tap
was soon discovered by one of our linemen patrolling the lines, and removed.
A thorough code system was used in this area for both telephone and
other means, and was very satisfactory for a time, but it was extremely
difficult to hold the line officers down to using the code when making
call.?, and prevent them from talking "in the clear." It
was quite evident that the Germans were provided with a very efficient
listening-in
system, and there is no doubt but that they were able to pick up our
telephone conversations at times. This was evident from the way in
which they shelled the roads leading up to our trenches on practically
every
night our troops made a relief. The gassing of our lines on the night
of the relief by the S9th Division is another good illustration.
On the morning of August 10 our Battalion was relieved by the 314th
Field Signal Battalion of the 89th Division.
Outside the trenches in the Lagny sector our telephone lines were run
on stakes, and farther back it was possible to have pole line leads of
iron and copper wire. The majority of the wire used, however, v as No.
17 twisted pair, which stood up better under all conditions and gave
very satisfactory transmission. The small No. 22 twist was very good
for raiding parties where it was only intended to be used for a few hours,
but is not practical for permanent or even semi-permanent use, as it
will not function during wet weather and is easily broken by concussion
from shells.
It was also decided during our stay in the Lagny sector to make some
changes in the distributions of our Signal personnel. Originally, each
regiment was assigned a platoon from the Outpost Company under command
of a Signal Corps lieutenant; small details from the Wire and Radio Companies
were assigned to each Brigade P.O. under command of a B Company lieutenant,
the remainder of A and B Company personnel working out of Division Headquarters.
It was soon discovered, however, that the greater part of the maintenance
and operations of the telephone net fell to the lot of Company B, which
operated from Division Headquarters inclusive to Regimental P.C.'s exclusive.
This is a small company of 75 men, which was found inadequate to handle
the work properly in so large an area.
To strengthen these details, each Outpost Platoon detailed six men to
its respective brigade, giving each brigade twelve men from the Outpost
Company, eight from the Wire Company and ten from the Radio Company.
In addition, there were generally six to eight men available from the
Brigade Headquarters Infantry detail. One Signal Corps truck was assigned
to each brigade. Each regiment furnished their Signal Corps detail one
G.S. wagon, and in some cases the battalion details were furnished an
ammunition cart to transport their signal property. Communications from
the Regimental P.C.'s forward were handled by the Outpost Company platoon
attached to the regiment. The Radio Company assigned one non-commissioned
officer to each infantry regiment, he being in charge of the radio, T.
P. S. and optical liaison within the regiment. The Infantry Signal platoon
under command of an infantry officer worked in conjunction with the Signal
Corps platoon.
This distribution of personnel remained unchanged during the remainder
of the operation of the 82nd Division at the front.
From August 10 to August 17 the Signal Battalion was in training at
Blenod-les-Tonl, from which place it was oi'dered with the Division to
the Marbache sector, north of Nancy, where we relieved the First Field
Signal Battalion of the Second Division.
The Marbache sector was also known as a quiet sector and the signal
work was of a similar nature as of that in the Lagny sector. Much Avork
was done, however, in improving the existing buried cable and aerial
telephone lines, many of which had been in existence for four years,
having been constructed by the French and now in very poor condition.
This work was in preparation for the oiifensive of the American First
Army, which had for its purpose the elimination of the famous St. Mihiel
Salient.
This was a favorite sector with the Germans for air raids - the towns
of Marbache (Division Headquarters), Dieulouard and Millery generally
being the targets. One night during the early part of September all trunks
from Division Headquarters forward were put out of commission for a few
minutes as a result of several large aerial bombs dropped by enemy aeroplanes.
Although these bombs exploded fully 200 feet from our telephone lines,
which were on standard poles, yet the concussion was sufficient to break
every line on both forward leads.
It was in this sector that the Divisional Artillery, the 157th Field
Artillery Brigade, joined the Division, relieving the 15th Field Artillery
Brigade, of the 2nd Division. The Artillery Signal details connected
their units with all Signal Corps switchboards and maintained their own
telephone lines. In addition, they also operated their own radio and
projector stations. 1st Lt. Walter C. Kiesel was detailed from the Signal
Battalion as liaison officer with the artillery brigade.
The Signal Corps and artillery worked in close cooperation, each using
the other's lines in cases of emergency. This proved to be a very convenient
and valuable arrangement for both.
In the St. Mihiel offensive on the morning of September 13, the Signal
Corps men went over the top with their "doughboy" comrades;
1st Lt. Clayborne Arthur an* the Fourth Outpost platoon of the Signal
Battalion were attached to the 328th Infantry Regiment. Shortly after
the troops arrived at Norroy, Lieutenant Arthur had his telephone line
into the town and ready to flash back the information that Norroy had
been taken. In this advance Lieutenant Arthur used the small No. 22
twisted pair. The circuit worked fairly well for a short time, but
a heavy rain
started and the line was soon unserviceable. To overcome this, a buzzer-phone
was connected to the line and fairly good transmission obtained by
buzzer telegraphy. A new line of No. 17 twisted pair was laid the following
night and telephonic communication reestablished. During this offensive
the Signal Battalion lost two men killed and more than a dozen wounded.
On September 20, the 90th Division took over the position of our troops
on the left bank of the Moselle River and the French the position on
the right bank. Our Division came out of the lines and withdrew into
the area just north of Nancy, Signal Battalion Headquarters being established
at Liverdun. Orders were received on September 22 to proceed to the Argonne
Forest, where our real work was to begin.
During the stay of the Division in the Marbache sector, a radio station
was established on Mousson Hill, in addition to the Division, Brigade
and Regimental stations. Several optical stations were also established
at observation posts along the front lines. It was not possible to make
much use of the optical stations, however, as they most invariably drew
fire from the German batteries. The optical station at the Port-sur-Seille
observation post rendered excellent service on several occasions in sending
back warnings of gas attacks. It was an easy matter for German aeroplanes
to come over and locate the position of these optical stations, thereby
disclosing the location of our O.P.'s and other important posts.
In addition to the Division, Brigade and Regimental switchboards, relay
boards were located at Pont-^-Mousson, Millery and Belleville.
Shortly before the Battalion left the Marbache sector Lieutenant Colonel
Hemphill v/as transferred to the Eighth Army Corps as Corps Signal Officer,
being relieved by Lt. Col. George E. B. Daily. It was with profound regret
that the 307th said good-by to Lieutenant Colonel Hemphill. He was Idolized
by every officer and man in the Battalion. Though possessing an extremely
stern personality and always insisting upon the strictest discipline,
his heart was of gold and the 307th Field Signal Battalion was always
uppermost in his thoughts. Everyone felt that his transfer was a serious
loss to our Battalion.
The Battalion moved into the Argonne Forest on the night of September
25, Battalion Headquarters being established in the woods about 500 meters
soutliwest of Rarecourt. On October 4 the Battalion moved up to Varennes
which had just been captured by the 35th Division. Division Headquarters
were established at Varennes the same day. Both the 163rd and 164th Brigades
were located in the woods west of Varennes with both Brigade Headquarters
in the old German rest camp at Champ-Mahaut. Two lines were laid from
this point to Varennes - the circuits being tied-in on trees where possible,
and across open fields it was laid out on the ground. All four regiments
and the three machine-gun battalions near by were given telephonic communication.
In tidditiou a line was put in from the joint brigade board to the 77th
Division Headquarters board at Champ Mahaut. Tliis gave us an emergency
outlet to Varennes via the 77th board and the Corps line.
On the night of October 6, the 327th and 328th Infantry regiments went
into the lines along the Aire River east of Chatel-Chehery and the following
morning went over the top.
Our No. 17 twisted pair was now getting scarce, and most of our new
supplies of wire was P. O. D. twist, which although a little smaller
than No. 17, was of much better grade than No. 22.
The difficult task of carrying the telephone lines forward with the
attack of the 164th Brigade was accomplished by Company B as far forward
as the Regimental P.C.'s and from there forward by the Outpost platoons
assigned to the 327th and 328th Infantry regiments. Capt. William T.
Busch, then in command of Company B laid two axis lines forward from
Varennes to Chaudron Farm where 164th Brigade Headquarters and the Advance
Information Center were established. TMs work was accomplished in a driving
rain and during the night which was pitch dark. In addition to this handicap,
the men were forced to work along roads badly congested with truck trains
and artillery moving up to the front. These two circuits from Varennes
to Chaudron Farm were laid out by truck part of the way and the remainder
by wire carts. The wire was reeled off the rear of the truck by placing
the wooden spools upon a digging bar placed across the rear of the truck.
As the wiring party neared Baulny and Chaundron Farm they were subjected
to heavy artillery fire.
The work of maintaining lines from the 164th Brigade P.O. to the P.C.'s
of the 327th and 328th Infantry regiments was in charge of 1st Lt. Clarence
G. Shriver, 164th Brigade Signal Officer. His task was extremely difficult.
His route extended across fields that were a sea of mud ; in many places
it was necessary to cross the Aire River and other smaller streams swollen
by the heavy rains. His men were continually under shell fire, which
also wrecked his lines at times almost as fast as they could be laid
out or repaired. In addition artillery pieces and ammunition carts were
continually moving over the telephone lines and breaking them. The work
was being done in pitch darkness. It was impossible of course to use
trucks so near the front lines and the spools of wire had to be carried
forward by hand. This was usually done by a detail of four men, with
from four to six men additional to work shifts in carrying the wire and
to replace casualties. It was not altogether a satisfactory method, but
the best that could be done under the circumstances, as all of our equipment
was for trench warfare and practically no equipment for open warfare,
excepting wire carts, which were as useless as trucks near the front
line. And our Brigade P.C.'s were generally quite near to the front lines.
We made considerable use of our wire carts as far up as was possible
to take them, but their value was considerably cut down due to the small
amount of circuit that could be carried on the cart drums. These carts
were built to hold five miles of single wire, or two and a half miles
of metallic circuit. This wire was not very good for metallic circuits,
however, due to induction and cross talk. A further handicap was the
difficulty in carrying food for the animals and the congestion of the
roads.
Maintaining communications in open warfare under these conditions therefore
was an enormous task. Stringing lines on poles, stakes or trees was out
of the question. First, the infantry advanced too rapidly. Second, there
were no poles, no stakes and in many places no treas. Details followed
up, however, readjusting the lines and getting them off the roads and
tying in on trees where possible. In ordei* to keep up with the fast
moving infantry it was necessary for the advance wiring parties to lay
their lines out on the ground as they advanced. In this manner we were
able to keep up telephone communication as far forward as regimental
P.C.'s practically without interruption. The lines were continually being
broken of course by the enemy shell fire and our own artillery pieces
and ammunition carts moving over them, but by stationing details every
few hundred yards along the route, repairs were made almost instantaneously.
Communication from the regiments forward, however, was a different question.
It was almost impossible at times, but most of the time the regimental
commanders were able to communicate with their battalion commanders by
telephone. This work was in diarge of 1st Lt. Olayborne Arthur with the
328th Infantry and 2nd Lt. Harvey E. Hannaford with the 327th. Lines
were carried forward by hand the same as from brigade to regiments. Their
task was all the more difficult as the men had to work through machine-gun
fire as well as artillery fire and gas. The lines were shot out more
frequently and the Battalion P.C.'s were changing continually; the supplies
of wire ran out rapidly and it was difficult to bring up fveslh supplies.
In spite of these handicaps, Lieutenants Arthur and Hannaford rendered
excellent service, going out personally with their men and making repairs
themselves. Too much credit can not be given to these regimental and
battalion signal men; their work was hazardous ; in fact they were under
fire and working through gas practically all of the time; they had no
time to seek shelter; their work lay in the open.
A division axis was always the first thing to be established, extending
from Division Headquarters along the line of advance as far forward as
the wires could be carried. One main axis line was carried forward from
division to eacli brigade, two extra lines laid as soon as positions
could be consolidated. We also carried one line forward on the axis for
use by the artillery brigade. The latter maintained their own lines within
their own units. Artillery regiments and brigade were also connected
with the nearest Signal Corps switchboai'd. This work was done by the
artillery and Signal Corps detail Jointly. Small details were placed
along these axis lines at frequent intervals to test in and repair breaks.
We had received a few replacements after reaching Varennes. Lieutenant
Matthews was missing in action. 2nd Lt. Timothy J. Murphy reported to
us at Varennes on October 3 and was assigned temporarily to Company B.
On the night of October 6, Lieutenant Murphy was given a detail of 12
signal men and ordered to lay a line from Chaudron Farm, which had just
been taken by the First Division, to an O.P. location, well out in front
and to the top of Hill 224, Although it was Lieutenant Murphy's first
experience at the front, he set out with his little detail and the wire
was laid during a high gas concentration and through heavy machine-gun
and shell fire. Two of his men were killed outright and two wounded.
A Y.M.C.A. man from the 1st Division who had volunteered to direct Lieutenant
Murphy toward the location was also killed. Several times this detail
of men were completely covered with earth from exploding shells. Returning
from this duty about dawn, he carried another line to the First Division
advance P.O. and another to the 164th Brigade P.O. of our Division, which
was then making its famous flanking attack across the Aire River against
Hills 180, 223, La Forge Farm and Cornay.
On October 8 Lieutenant Murphy was transferred to the Outpost Company,
and assigned in command of the Second Platoon attached to the 326th Infantry
of the 163rd Brigade, who wera going iu to relieve the 28th Division
on the left side of the river. 1st Lt. John O. Burnette was in command
of the First Outpost Platoon attached to the 325th Infantry, and Lt.
Dellmann O. Hood, who had the previous day been promoted to Captain,
was the 163rd Brigade Signal Officer. This relief of the 28th Division
was made during the night in a driving rain storm on roads and across
fields that were a sea of mud. About this time the 325th Infantry was
detached from the 163rd Brigade and attached to the 164th Brigade, which
had suffered heavily in casualties. Lieutenant Burnette was seriously
wounded on October 9 and evacuated. Sergeant First Class James M. Davis
assumed command of the platoon, and since has received one Division,
and one Regimental citation for the excellent manner in which he handled
it.
The 326th Infantry jumped off at La Pelette Ravine, Signal Corps men
going over with them and installing lines from this ravine forward with
the advanced attacking elements. The brigade detail under command of
Captain Hood followed upon the heels of the regimental details establishing
communications from brigade to regiment. The work of keeping the brigades
connected with Division Headquarters was being carried out by details
from Company B in command of Captain Busch. It was possible to do this
work with the use of trucks and wire carts.
This work carried us through the very heart of the Argonne Woods, through
constant shelling, gassing and machine-gun fire. Rain fell in torrents
practically without let up. We were forced to work during the night through
pitch darkness, feeliag and groping our way along and finding our way
as best possible. Our advance was carried forward through Le Chene-Tondu,
La Besogne, Pylone, Marcq, and later St. Juvin and Hill 182. General
Cronin, commanding the 163rd Brigade, generally maintained his P.C. at
the same place or near by the 325th or 326th Regimental P.C.'s until
our movements became more stationary. When this was the case we were
able to consolidate more or less regimental and l)rigade signal details
and work both ways. Near Marcq, during the attack upon St. Juvin, it
was necessary to filter our signal men across the Aire River to the right,
or east side, and follow up the attack from the southeast. The Signal
Corps Platoon with the 326th Infantry carried a line from the Regimental
P.C. at Pylone down the Decauville railroad, through the woods, and across
the Aire River to the P.C. of the 325tli Infantry. The maintenance of
this line was an example of the courage displayed by our men, it being
necessary to work through a river valley filled with gas and constantly
under machine-gun and artillery fire, at times amounting to nearly a
barrage. Sergeant Arthur De Haven crossed the Aire River eight times
oa this night before he could complete his line to the 325th. Time and
again he went back and forth to make repairs.
The 163rd Brigade was relieved here by the 77th Division, and moved
its P.C. to Cornay, the 32eth crossing the Aire and taking up a position
to the left of the 325th with Regimental I'.O. about half a kilometer
southeast of St. Juviu.
One of the Battalion P.C.'s of the 326th was located in the town proper.
The relieving battalion of the 77th Division came up without a Signal
Corps detail, or any Signal equipment. Sergeant Wilbur P. Stanley, of
the Signal Corps Platoon with the 326th Infantry, remained with this
battalion of the 77th Division and maintained communication for them
until their Signal men came up the following day. He was given ten men
from his platoon. During this work he lost one man killed and two wounded.
In addition, we left two telephones and a four-line switchboard for use
by the 77th. They also took over a line for their use, which we had previously
put in from Pylone to La Besogne, saying that they expected to establish
a Battalion P.C. at the latter place and had no telephone communication.
Division Headquarters had subsequently moved up from Varennes to La
Forge, and from La Forge to Ch^h^ry Farm. We had anticipated taking over
the lines laid by the 28th Division but these lines were in such bad
condition that we had to lay new lines practically the entire route.
Captain Busch had established an axis up the Chatel-Chehry-Cornay
Road from Chatel-Chehery to Cornay of four trunk lines with a relay
board
at Cornay. The 163rd Brigade moved into Cornay and took over this
board. Two lines had previously been laid from PylSue to Cornay by
the 163rd
Brigade Signal detail. These lines were now used for lateral communication
with the 77th Division. Our axis lines from Chatel-Ch"5h4ry
to Cornay were later turaed over to the 78th Division and our axis
re-run from
Pleinchamp Farm, when our Division Headquarters moved up to Fl^ville.
The 164tli Brigade Headquarters were now loacted at Fleville. Three
lines were carried forward from Cornay to Martincourt Farm by Sergeant
First
Class Isaac M. Lowry, of Captain Busch's detail, to be used later
for the division axis. This Avas accomplished uuder a heavy bombardment
from
German artillery and machine-gun fire. Three lines were also laid
from Cornay to Fleville to meet the new division axis there. About
October
14 the 163rd Brigade Headquarters were also moved to Fleville, the
78th Division taking over Cornay. One of the Fleville-Cornay circuits
was
used as Brigade lateral between Fleville and the right brigade of
the 78th; another was taken over by the 319th Field Artillery of
our Division,
at Cornay, to connect with the 320th Field Artillery at Fleville,
and the tliird was used for an 82nd Division O, P. located near Martincourt
Farm. From Cornay forward we used one of the axis lines laid by Sergeant
Lowry.
327th and 328th Regimental Headquarters were now located at Sommerance,
about three kilometers northeast of Fleville; the 325th and 326th along
the Sommerance-St. Juvin Road. Operations had settled down to more or
less of a waiting game. A joint switchboard for the 163rd and 164th Brigades
was established at Fleville with a network of circuits to Sommerance,
the 325th and 326th P.C.'s. Relay stations were established at several
places along these circuits. Latei'al lines were laid between all regiments
and even between relay stations. In this manner we established a net
whereby we were able to have communication forward with practically no
interruption. If one side was shot out, we could get through around the
other side or through the middle, and vice versa.
General Cronin, commanding tlie 163rd Brigade, established an advance
P.C. at the 325th Regimental P.C. and General Lindsey, of the 164th Brigade,
established his at Sommerance. These two P.C.'s were connected with the
regimental switchboards. Although we had now settled down to stationary
fighting, our troubles had not ceased by any means. In fact we suffered
more casualties in this sector than any of the others. The enemy shelled
the area from Fleville forward to the front lines almost incessantly.
Fleville and Sommerance were subjected to extremely heavy shell fire
and gassing. This of coui'se played havoc with our lines and kept our
men out pretty much all of the time. The details were so arranged that
when a wire was shot out, a detail would start from each end, clearing
trouble until they met or until the circuit cleared.
The advanced signal working parties were supplied with wire and equipment
from advance signal dumps, established generally near Brigade Headquarters.
The wire and material usually had to be carried from brigade by hand.
Two men of the 307th Field Signal Battalion have received Distinguished
Service Crosses, three otliers recommended and approved; nineteen have
received Division citations and fourteen Regimental citations. General
Cronin, in a letter to the commanding otficer of the battalion, highly
commended the work of the Signal detail attached to his Brigade in command
of myself. Captain Shriver was likewise highly commended by General Lindsey
of the 164th Brigade and our regimental Signal officers commended by
their respective regimental commanders for our work during the operations
of the Division at the front.
The real credit, however, for the success of the battalion in maintaining
lines of information is due the enlisted men of the organization. Our
non-commissioned officers were excellent; the morale and spirit of the
men admirable. The uppermost thought in their minds at all times was
the success of the Division and the Signal Battalion.
I also wish to take tliis opportunity of expressing my admiration of
the excellent work done by the Signal details of our artillery. Their
men were equally courageous and were always to be found out on their
lines repairing breaks, the same as ours. They kept up their telephone
lines and nets in excellent shape and never overlooked an opportunity
to assist our men in every way possible. We tried to reciprocate as much
as possible, but could not do as much as we would have liked owing to
our heavy casualties.
During the Meuse-Argonne offensive we used the radio very little; seldom
used the T. P. S., and never used optics. We made some use of our pigeons
on several occasions.
It was almost impossible to establish radio stations at Regimental P.C.'s
and where they were established the infantry officers did not use them,
as all messages had to be enciphered and deciphered, which took up so
much time as to render the messages practically of no value - and then,
too, the telephone was generally available. The radio details were always
on hand, however, ready for use in an emergency.
Soil conditions did not favor the use of the T. P. S. This means of
signaling is fairly good in trench warfare, but of not much value in
open warfare. Optics are out of the question in open warfare. Furthermore,
infantry commanders as a rule will not allow them to be set up near their
P.C.'s, as they invariably draw fire.
The telephone was our most useful means of communication and we lent
all of our energies toward its maintenance. Onr success in doing this
will readily be attested to by all line officers of the Division who
had occasion to use the telephone.
"WE WENT INTO THE FIGHT DETERMINED TO KEEP UP COMMUNICATIONS
AND WE DID IT."
[ End of Excerpt ]
